In the first part of the paper, we discuss the debate surrounding the legislation with particular emphasis on the ways in which demands for public consultation, public debate and the education of Australians about the potential ethical and scientific impact of human embryonic stem cells (hESC) research were deployed, and the explicit and implicit framing of the scope of public consultation. We then ask whether, given the calls for public consultations, debate and understanding, current work in democratic theory could be helpful in analyzing the process of policy-making in these areas. In particular, we canvass the literature relating to aggregative and deliberative models of democracy for processes that support the legitimacy of policy. We identify features of the debate that reflect the appeal of deliberative approaches as well as some of the possible hurdles or limitations to developing deliberative democratic approaches to policy in ethically contentious areas.
Introduction
This article offers a brief historical review of the processes that led to the enactment of Australian Commonwealth (federal) legislation on human embryo experimentation and cloning.(see also 1, 2) In light of those aspects of the policy-making process that appealed to public consultation, identification of community standards, and the need for the legislation to be in keeping with the views of the Australian public, we consider the challenges of developing public policy in these ethically contentious areas by drawing on current theoretical work on deliberative democracy.
Prior to 2002, research on human embryos was not regulated directly by federal law. The National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) had developed a series of guidelines that were regularly reviewed and revised concerning embryo research, and several Australian states had legislation regulating both embryo research and assisted reproductive technology (ART). State-based legislation varied considerably, ranging from no legal regulation (relying entirely on the NHMRC guidelines and the judgment of individual research ethics committees in some states such as New South Wales), to quite comprehensive legislation (for instance in Victoria, which arguably as a result was the fastest to be outstripped by technological developments). As most of the publicly accessible debate has occurred in the Australian federal parliament, we focus on legislative processes, including submissions made in the context of various parliamentary reviews, and on popular media coverage of legislative processes. We argue that, at least symbolically, the calls in those processes for ongoing public dialogue, for public education and consultation, and for open discussion about the value of the science and the ethical issues involved in embryo and cloning research express concerns that policy-making in this ethically contentious area should be responsive to the attitudes of Australians and should reflect a process of deliberation rather than unreflective preference expression. In fact, as we demonstrate below, there is little evidence that those involved in the legislative process genuinely sought broader public involvement and engagement with the issues raised by the science or the legislation. However, we believe that it is worth asking whether and how developments in democratic theory can usefully guide policy-development processes concerning issues like hESC research and human cloning. We examine the possible application of deliberative models of democracy to policy development in areas such as hESC research and therapeutic cloning and identify some of the possible limitations to such approaches and hurdles they may face.
Part I: The Legislative History
Australia is composed of six states-New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, and Tasmania-that are self-governing within the constitutional limits of the federal structure, and two territories-the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory-that have self-governing, regional governments, but that do not have the constitutional status of statehood. The Commonwealth (federal) government has a limited range of legislative responsibilities, which includes power to legislate regarding corporations, commerce, trade, and interstate trade. Both state and federal legislatures can make law regarding criminal offences. The Commonwealth provides the bulk of funding for universities, resources for health care, and public funding for research. The states have direct responsibility for many areas of law and policy, including health law, provision of health services (hospitals), and education.
Legislation associated with assisted reproductive technology (ART) and embryo experimentation is, constitutionally, a matter for state governance. In proposing the legislation concerning embryo research and cloning, the Commonwealth government chose to make use of its corporations power within the Constitution (Section 51 (xx)) to impose consistent law across the country that would provide a framework for future state legislation and override current state legislation that was inconsistent with the Commonwealth law. Some of the first Australian legislation relating to stem cell research had its roots in earlier state legislation in Victoria (1984, 1995) , South Australia (1988), and Western Australia (1991), all of which banned destructive research on embryos. This legislation also provided guidelines for storage of embryos for ART and their destruction after a set period (which differed from state to state), as well as a ban on human cloning (although cloning was defined differently in each state). The original Victorian legislation had a strict regulatory system that included criminal penalties, which was replaced in the later act by a licensure system for ART clinics and providers. Research that destroys or diminishes the potential for an embryo to be re-implanted was prohibited, which effectively prohibited hESC research. Both the South Australian and Western Australian legislation also included licensure systems and codes of practice for ART providers, but were slightly more permissive with regard to the research activities allowed.
In most other states, committees were convened to examine ART practices. In addition, in New South Wales, the Law Reform Commission issued a set of detailed reports, none of which resulted in legislation.(1) Some states, such as New South Wales, also had additional, specific guidelines requiring ethics committee oversight. In the states and territories without legislation, researchers were primarily bound by the NHMRC's Ethical Guidelines on Assisted Reproductive Technology (1996) (6) clinics could be used for research that damaged or destroyed the embryos, so long as these projects had the consent of the couple whose tissues were used in the creation of the embryos, had been approved by ethics committees, and had been issued a 'license'; these rules would apply equally to private and public researchers working in Australia.
While the Andrews Committee's deliberations were ongoing, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG)-an organization that fosters discussion between state, territory, and Commonwealth heads of government in an effort to promote consistent legislation-was also debating the regulation of cloning and related technologies. 
Democracy and Public Consultation
In arguments concerning ethically contentious areas of policy development, particularly in cases where scientific knowledge, theories, and techniques are rapidly changing, it is typically assumed that policy-makers should assess and track public attitudes toward the relevant scientific developments. This is due, in part, to the state's role as the 'guardian of the public interest', (14: xxxii) and also to the idea within liberal theory that the legitimacy of public policies depends, in principle, on the ability of the policy-maker to justify those policies to any reasonable member of the society. These are not matters to be decided behind closed doors by scientists or lawyers, however expert and sincere, without widespread community consultation. Nor are they matters that can be resolved by doing nothing. As a society we are confronted with profound issues that require ongoing attention and discussion.(3: xiii)
The Report also appears to hold the view that debate about the significance of scientific advances should be encouraged within the scientific community and should inform regulation: 'So that regulation in this area is appropriate to these benefits and risks [of developments in treatment of human diseases], the debate and consultation over the issues arising from the scientific advances in science should be as informed as possible'. (3: 3) In its conclusions, the Andrews Report indicates that AHEC should be charged with responsibility for 'developing and implementing a strategy to consult and involve the public in consideration of the issues arising from this research and encourage debate on the potential and implications of the research'. 1 (3: 228) . Similarly, in submissions to the Andrews Report and in the subsequent debate that led to the passage of the federal legislation, various politicians, ethicists, and legal commentators claimed that there was need for continuing public debate on the social and ethical consequences of hESC research and the potential for therapeutic cloning. (13) For example, Senators Stott Despoja, Lucas and Webber argued for 'better mechanisms to educate and involve the public in bioethical issues. We need to ensure that the public has access to information, that they are educated about the issues in language they understand, and that they feel able to make their voices heard on the issues'. 
Part II: Aggregative and Deliberative Models of Democracy

The processes leading to the passage of the Prohibition of Human Cloning and Research
Involving Human Embryos Acts in 2002 do not offer a model of participatory democratic public policy development, despite the many references to a need for public consultation, engagement, and deliberation. There are probably many reasons for this beyond those identified above, including lack of public interest in the issues, economic interests, and party political issues. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to investigate the potential and the pitfalls of democratic approaches to legitimate policy-making in ethically contentious areas against the backdrop of these recent processes.
Within democratic theory, there are competing ideals of democratic legitimacy: some emphasize that democracy seeks to treat the interests and values of citizens equally, and some emphasize that democracy seeks a politics in which citizens participate in reasoning about what policies or institutions ought to be adopted (17, 18) . These two ideals correspond to aggregative and deliberative models of democracy.
The demand for democratic equality (evidenced in plebiscites or referenda) and representative democracy (where elected representatives mirror the values of the majority who elected them) does not require that the interests implicit in the policies selected through the democratic process reflect the enlightened or considered judgment of the people or demos. Rather, legitimacy comes from the fact that policies reflect the preferences expressed by the majority, however constituted. As Jane Mansbridge This emphasis on democratic equality or the aggregative model has been criticized on the following fronts: that it allows those with greater wealth or power to influence unduly how the competing interests are reflected in policy; that voting is a poor process for ranking priorities; that it provides insufficient protection against 'the tyranny of the majority'; that it silences minority interests; that it cannot address issues of uncertainty; and that it frames politics as adversarial, rather than as a normative practice of reciprocal obligation of justification. (19, (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) Recent work extends deliberative approaches by incorporating critical assessment of established power structures that may shape and limit deliberation and recognizing the significance of the historical absence or exclusion of oppressed groups from public reasoning fora. (20, 25) In the demand for public, scientific, and expert debate about the ethical issues surrounding hESC research in Australia, there is evidence of appeals both to aggregative legitimacy and to discursive deliberation (even if many of these calls were more symbolic than real). The call by Senator Heffernan and his colleagues for a parliamentary committee to review the legislation, as 'members of parliament [are] appropriate representatives of community concerns',(13: 135) can be understood as based on the aggregative appeal to political legitimacy in the negotiation of citizens' actual preferences, rather than their transformation through deliberation. In contrast, the calls for a forum for public debate on the issues raised by embryo research, human cloning, and the proposed legislation, and particularly the claim by Senator Stott Despoja and her colleagues that there is a need for 'better mechanisms to educate and involve the public in bioethical issues',(13: 170) echo the advocates of deliberative democracy in their suggestion that legitimacy is grounded in processes of public reasoning. Given the limitations of aggregative models detailed above, we turn to examining the possibilities and limitations of deliberative models of democracy for democratically legitimate policymaking processes.
The Challenge of Deliberation
Is a deliberative approach to democratic legitimacy an appropriate ideal for democratic decision-making in ethically-contentious areas such as hESC research, embryo experimentation more generally, or therapeutic cloning? In this section, we identify some of the hurdles that a deliberative approach would have to surmount, and some of the 'pathologies of deliberation' that could beset debate concerning embryo research. We consider various preconditions for effective deliberation and offer two examples of policy-making processes in similar areas that have been used in Australia and Canada and that appear to fulfill these basic preconditions to a greater or lesser extent. We argue that these examples could be followed in public deliberation regarding hESC regulation.
The first hurdle to processes of deliberative democracy is the willingness of deliberators to change their mind as the result of deliberation and the attitude of deliberators towards each other's opinions. As John Dryzek writes:
One defining feature of deliberative democracy is that individuals participating in democratic processes are amenable to changing their minds and their preferences as a result of the reflection induced by deliberation. (25: 31) The requirement that individuals be prepared to 'play the game' of deliberation-to participate in the exercise of public reasoning with an open mind to the views of other deliberators-goes to the heart of the democratic appeal of deliberative approaches.
Citizens participating in processes of deliberation can be thought of as motivated by concern for 'the common good' or at least minimal respect for the distinct views of their fellow citizens. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue that deliberative approaches appeal to a notion of justice, namely that of reciprocity, and that reciprocity entails a level of respect for fellow citizens and hence recognition of a need to justify one's views to them:
Reciprocity holds that citizens owe one another justifications for mutually binding laws and public policies that they collectively enact. The aim of a theory that takes reciprocity seriously is to help people to seek political agreement on the basis of principles that can be justified to others who A further challenge to deliberation in areas of rapid scientific development is that the citizenry who might participate in deliberative discussion often lack (or feel that they lack) the knowledge and information required to evaluate the science or policies under consideration. Alan Irwin notes the need for development of a public understanding of science, and hence for experts to engage in open debate about the value and risks of relevant scientific developments so that citizen-deliberators are in a position to weigh the merits of the scientific arguments for themselves.(32) As Dryzek puts it, an effective citizen voice in economic and technological developments requires a citizenry that is appropriately circumspect in its response to the authority of experts: …distrust of experts does not mean that everyone has to become an expert.
Instead, it can mean approaching expert testimony with a sceptical attitude, perhaps questioning the credentials of experts, seeking corroboration for any contentious claim, refusing to believe an expert if his or her research is funded by the offending industry, or if his or her record indicates an axe to grind. (25: 165) It is unlikely that 'experts' in the debates surrounding hESC research in Australia will be considered free from potential bias: the scientists who have the greatest experience of the research are often those, like Trounson, who have been at the forefront of the research and who have the most to gain in terms of research and financial opportunities. The ethical and religious 'experts' who have pronounced on the issues (e.g., in submissions to the Andrews inquiry and the recent LRC) often express views based in their religious or ideological commitments. Therefore, in order to have effective deliberation, the citizens who will be affected by the regulations must develop critical skills in evaluating the claims made by experts on all sides. The primary avenue for most citizens to gain information about these developments is the mass media; however such sources primarily provide 'sound-bite' news reports or current affairs programs that seek to reduce complex issues to simplistic adversarial positions. (30: 40) The hESC debate in Australia has been framed in the media as a 'science versus religion' debate that oversimplifies and polarizes the range of plausible positions. Policy-makers who seek to be informed by public deliberative processes will need to identify means for developing public fora within which truly effective deliberation may occur.
Conclusion-Deliberative Optimism
Our conclusion to this overview of some of the challenges for deliberative democracy is not, ultimately, as pessimistic as it might first seem. We note the significant limitations of aggregative approaches and the political and economic influences that raise questions about the legitimacy of bargain-based preference expression as a means of legitimating policy. We also recognize the challenges facing those who would seek to develop models for open deliberative discussion of policy that could then inform legislators. However, we do not believe that the challenges are insurmountable or should be avoided. Indeed, within Australia there is a precedent for more deliberative policy Regulation of human genetic privacy, in our view, is no less technically complex than regulation of hESC research. Given the potential developments in genomics and social policy surrounding genetics, genetic privacy matters may become as socially divisive as hESC research. Even if debates surrounding human embryo research prove to be more divisive than those about genetic privacy, that is not a reason for avoiding deliberation, given the significance of the process of public reasoning for the legitimacy of the resultant policy. The process that the ALRC and AHEC joint inquiry followed in meeting its aims fulfilled many of the preconditions discussed above and followed closely an and soft copy as the first step in the public consultation process. Nearly a year later, the matters raised in that Issues Paper together with the response to that paper by key stakeholders (and other expert input) were refined into a Discussion Paper that was again widely circulated in hard copy and on the internet to promote public education and debate on the issue of genetic privacy. The ALRC and AHEC joint inquiry process reflected its key aim 'to find a sensible path that meets twin goals: to foster innovations in genetic research and practice that serve humanitarian ends, and to provide sufficient reassurance to the community that such innovations will be subject to proper ethical scrutiny and legal (and other) controls'. (33: 33-34) The direct community consultation process involved a number of face-to-face meetings and public submissions. There were also 15 open public fora in capital cities and regional centers, at which members of the Inquiry's Working Group presented information about the issues and process of the Inquiry; questions and comments from the people who attended also were recorded, opening up debate among members of the public and experts. Over 200 meetings were held between the ALRC and AHEC team and key stakeholders, including meetings with international bodies. Over 300 written submissions were received, most of which were made available publicly through the Those recommendations reflect a debate that, while focused through the terms of reference set by the Attorney General, was not narrowly restricted to discussion of Australians' ethical attitudes to specific features of the issues at stake. The submissions received and contributions made to the public meetings can be viewed as more genuinely reflecting a process of deliberation within which the participants were seeking to understand, explain, and persuade others with regard to matters relevant to policy development, rather than 'scoring points' in a political bargain for a specific legislative outcome.
While it is possible for these intensive iterative consultation processes to be subverted by well-organized groups reflecting one perspective held in the community, it is certainly the case that any legislation that is developed as a result of this type of process and based on the recommendations of the Inquiry can make a claim to legitimacy based on public deliberation in a way that legislation that has not had the benefit of such a process cannot. given their history of closed parliamentary inquiries and public consultation limited in both scope and volume, as evidence of a process of deliberative policy development. That deliberation, and the legitimacy that would be afforded to policy informed by it, has yet to be seen in Australia on the issue of hESC research, but it could be developed using methods similar to the ALRC and AHEC Inquiry process. An opportunity to do so could arise when Parliament receives the report of the LRC and again when the NHMRC Guidelines relating to human embryo research and human cloning are next reviewed. It will be interesting to witness the further processes that result from the recommendations of the LRC, but there is little reason to be optimistic that the immediate legislative process will be characterized by effective deliberation, particularly if it is conducted in the usual manner.
